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Abstract 
American vice presidential candidates are chosen for several reasons. Some of these 
rationales are easy to be recognized, while others belong to the cockles of the heart 
of the presidential candidates. Social scientists and journalists agree about the fac-
tors that are more essential: the vice presidential (VP) nominee’s capacity of balanc-
ing the ideological and personal characteristics of the presidential candidate and the 
“native son” effect, namely the guarantee that the VP nominee would carry his/her 
own state. These strategies are often combined and they work at different electoral 
levels: the first one has usually a national or macro-regional significance while the 
second is crucial in the battleground states. This research is divided into two sec-
tions: the first one investigates the “balancing the ticket” strategy, offering an over-
view of about one century of presidential races. The second aims to verify the VP 
nominee’s effect in his/her home state. The results will confirm that there have been 
several running mates who have been selected in order to “balance the ticket” but 
also that the vice president nominee’s effect in the home states has been quite poor. 
Keywords: American Politics; American Political History; American Presidential 
Campaigns; Political Strategies and Party Politics.   
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Introduction  
An accepted wisdom is that vice presidential candidates are of minor impor-
tance to most voters. Perhaps as a result there have not been much research 
aimed at the reasons and the effect of vice presidential nominee selection (Ad-
kinson 1982, 331; Wattenberg 1995) and most of them tried to measure a “na-
tional effect” (Wattenberg and Grofman 1993, 175; Grofman and Kline 2010).
Particularly, Grofman and Kline study examined voters’ specific preferences 
for both President and Vice President and found that about 11% of the popula-
tion on average has “conflicted” preferences — where a voter prefers the pres-
idential candidate of one party but also likes the vice presidential nominee of 
the other party. Using this data, they estimate the degree to which a vice presi-
dential candidate alone might determine the electoral result. The two schol-
ars note that these patterns of “conflicted” voting behaviour have decreased over 
time: only 6.9 per cent and 6.8 per cent of the electorate had conflicted prefer-
ences in 2004 and 2008, likely the outcome of “increasing partisan polarization.” 
Grofman and Kline found out that the direct effect of a vice presidential candi-
date is generally less than 1 per cent in terms of getting voters to cross party lines:
And, in order to better approach this field of study, we also should not forget that pop-
ular culture sees voters taking the president and the vice president as a “package deal.” 
Only in 1972 was more than 1 per cent of the final vote af-
fected by conflicted vice presidential and presidential pref-
erences; on average, over the 1968-2008 period, the net im-
pact of conflicted presidential and vice presidential choices is 
only slightly less than 0.6% of the votes shifted (p. 1).  
Grofman and Kline also pointed out that there were two relevant 
caveats to their findings: 
Data may understate the impact of vice presidential selection on 
choice because voters modify their views of the president based on 
vice presidential selection, and thus the data we report may be ‘con-
taminated’ by unmeasured effects of vice presidential choice. Sec-
ond, mobilizing effects of vice presidential choice vis-à-vis turnout 
or campaign contributions or campaign activism are not reflect-
ed in our measures. For example, the selection of Sarah Palin was 
widely credited in the media as having motivated a Republican base 
that did not find McCain that attractive a candidate” (Grofman and 
Kline 2010, 1).  
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It is interesting to note that Palin’s choice revived academic interest around the fig-
ure of the Vice Presidential nominees. Ulbig (2010) focused her research on what 
extent do vice presidential candidates affect individual-level vote choice for pres-
ident. She found out that when vice presidential candidates draw media interest, 
feelings about them become much more relevant to voters. Investigating Palin’s can-
didacy, who drew high level of media attention, Ulbig discovered that feelings about 
her exerted a stronger impact on vote choice, especially among Independent voters. 
Other research explored the so-called “home-state effect”, that is well-known for Pres-
idential candidates and kind of controversial for VP nominees: Devine and Kopko 
(2011) argue that selecting a vice presidential candidate from a small state is not suf-
ficient to produce a significant vice presidential home state advantage. The same au-
thors, a few years later (2013), found out that vice presidential home state advantages 
are statistically negligible and conditioned on the interactive effect of political expe-
rience and state population. Furthermore, their results indicate that the mobilization 
of new voters primarily accounts for presidential home state advantage, while vice 
presidential home state advantage is mainly due to the conversion of existing voters. 
Our research goes on a different direction: first, we go through the last 24 presi-
dential elections and we try to understand which rationales brought presidential 
candidates to choose their running mates. Reasoning on a qualitative level, we aim 
to show the different strategies employed by the parties and the candidates in order 
to make the tickets more appealing to the populations and so to maximize votes. 
In the second section, we measure the actual vice presidential nominee effect, 
at least in his/her home state. By monitoring the difference between the perfor-
mance of the ticket at the national level with the one in the VP home state and 
comparing this margin with the one obtained in the previous and in the subse-
quent presidential election, we are able to estimate the VP effect at state-level.
The First Strategy: Balancing the Ticket 
Many observers think that John F. Kennedy’s selection of Lyndon Johnson as vice 
presidential nominee helped him winning the South in 1960. However, citizens’ 
electoral behaviour is mainly driven by the name at the top of the ticket and there 
are probably not many voters who are attracted from who a candidate chooses 
as his VP. Nevertheless, the selection of a running mate can give voters a better 
viewpoint into the kind of person, and politician, a presidential candidate really is. 
Since the vice presidential selection process captures a lot of media attention, 
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presidential scholars agree that a candidate selecting a running mate should 
try to avoid controversies. Generally speaking, one of the main rules for pick-
ing a VP nominee follows the saying ‘first, do no harm’. And yet, this is often in-
fringed. That is because finding a recognized figure with no contraindications is 
hard, since all high profile politicians have negative traits linked to their image. 
The presidential candidate and his campaign staff have difficult choices to make. 
First of all, they have to decide whether to run with a VP candidate who inte-
grates the top of ticket, helping him to win battleground states, or instead select 
someone who strengthens the nominee’s image. In 2008, Senator John McCain 
experienced how the early assumptions can change over time, when his attempt 
to galvanize conservatives and rural sympathizers by choosing Sarah Palin did 
not work out as expected. Another example of how the original purposes can 
derail are those of Missouri Senator Thomas Eagleton, selected but then rapidly 
dismissed by George McGovern in 1972, after evidence emerged about his men-
tal health problems, and of Dan Quayle, whom George H.W. Bush chose in 1988 
hoping that he would help the campaign in gaining in popularity among young 
voters. Instead, Quayle became a sort of “a national joke” (Goldstein 2007). 
Nominees from the moderate part of the Republican Party, such as Gerald Ford, 
George H.W. Bush, Bob Dole and John McCain have felt obliged to select vice pres-
idential candidates who are favourite by the party’s right wing (Quayle, Jack Kemp 
and Sarah Palin above all). On the other hand, Ronald Reagan thought he had to 
demonstrate that he was open to more moderate views and decided to select George 
H. W. Bush, a centrist experienced Texas politician. Among Democrats, Walter Mon-
dale and Lloyd Bentsen also appeared to be sort of “balancing acts” for Jimmy Cart-
er and Michael Dukakis respectively. Finally, Bill Clinton decided to strengthen his 
image as “New Democrat”, picking another emerging Southern politician, Al Gore. 
In recent years, many political scientists argued that in 2008 Joe Biden has been 
selected because he is white, mature and experienced, in order to balance the ticket 
with the young, black and less experienced Barack Obama. With the same logic, 
John Edwards would have been picked to gain votes in the Southern states and in 
order to balance the “elitist and New Englander” John Kerry’s image. And in 2012, 
Paul Ryan has probably been selected for his conservative policy standings, his 
youthful energy and powerful speech making. Indeed, the previous five Republican 
vice presidential candidates were all conservative and they were usually chosen for 
balancing out some possible weakness at the top of the ticket (Gruhl et al. 2012, 228). 
Dick Cheney was expected to give dignity and international politics experience 
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to George W. Bush. Dan Quayle and Sarah Palin were supposed to bring young 
votes to George H. W. Bush and John McCain (Mitt Romney has almost never been 
criticized for being “too old,” maybe because he looked much younger than his 65 
years). Bob Dole’s choice of Jack Kemp is probably more similar to Romney’s selec-
tion of Paul Ryan. Kemp, who by the way was one of Ryan’s political mentors, was 
conservative on fiscal policy, like Ryan. But he was moderate on social policy, which 
Ryan is not. In 1996, Bill Clinton performed very well in rural zones, something 
unusual for “modern” Democrats, so Dole probably thought that Jack Kemp could 
move forward Republicans’ reputation in the urban areas (Gruhl et al. 2012, 229). 
That is for what concerns recent elections. But the whole history of the Ameri-
can presidential elections is full of stories that show in different manners which 
reasons stay behind VP nominee selection. Most of these insights are anecdo-
tal, but some of the most distant campaigns enforce the idea that “balancing the 
ticket” is one of strategies that are most employed by the presidential candidates. 
One of the best known VP nominee selection happened in 1984. As soon as 
Walter Mondale secured the Democratic nomination, the idea of choosing a 
woman as his vice presidential candidate got significant public opinion atten-
tion. The National Organization for Women and the National Women’s Political 
Caucus supported the idea, as did several high profile Democratic figures such 
as House Speaker Tip O’Neill (Morrow 1984). Geraldine Ferraro, House Rep-
resentative from New York’s 9th district, became the first woman to run for vice 
presidency for a major party (Glass 2007). The Democratic staff hoped that her 
selection would change a campaign in which Mondale was trailing badly in the 
polls. And, in addition to attracting women, they hoped she could gain consen-
sus among ethnic Democrats in the Northeast, that were a part of the electorate 
who had abandoned their party for Reagan in 1980 (Goldman and Fuller 1995, 
228). Ferraro was also Roman Catholic and that, for the Democratic advisors, 
could have also helped with Catholic voters. As for the negative downsides, Ferra-
ro did not have political experience at high level (Goldman and Fuller 1995, 237). 
Among political experts, the choice of Ferraro was considered as a bet, and it was 
not sure if she could add votes or not to the Mondale campaign (Braden, 1996, 111). 
Although her selection was appreciated by the majority of the Democratic activists, 
opinion polls conducted right after the national convention showed that only 22 
percent of women voters liked Ferraro’s selection, versus 18 percent who thought she 
was not the best available candidate. Furthermore, 33 per cent of all voters believed 
that women’s rights groups lobbying influenced Mondale’s decision. Nonetheless, in 
the same days Ferraro proved to be able to run an energetic campaign and sometimes 
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she was even able to obscure Mondale in the national media coverage. Mondale had 
been 16 points behind Reagan in polls before selecting Ferraro, and after the con-
vention he even tied the race for a short time (Ferraro and Whitney 1998, 171-181). 
On the Election Day, the Democratic ticket lost the race in a landslide. Reagan and 
Bush won the 59 per cent of the popular vote, while Mondale and Ferraro secured just 
41 per cent of it. In the Electoral College, they carried only Mondale’s home state of 
Minnesota and the District of Columbia. Ferraro was not even able to prevail in her 
own congressional district, which always tended to vote Republican in presidential 
races. Ferraro’s contribution to the ticket – considered her supposed strength among 
minority voters - was poor. 55 per cent of women voters chose Reagan. And the incum-
bent President also got about the same percentage among Catholic voters, the highest 
level ever achieved by a Republican presidential candidate (Ferraro 2004, 312-313). 
In 1976, Minnesota Senator Walter Mondale was on the other end of the ticket, 
when little-known Georgia’s Governor, Jimmy Carter chose him, a liberal and po-
litical protégé of Hubert Humphrey, as his running mate. A selection which was 
probably made in order to add a “Northern” figure to balance the “Southern” Carter. 
Eight years earlier, Spiro Agnew’s moderate beliefs, immigrant ancestry, and pop-
ularity in a leaning Democratic state such as Maryland marked that he was the 
perfect match for the 1968 Republican presidential nominee, former Vice Presi-
dent Richard Nixon. As an example of what would later be defined Nixon’s “South-
ern Strategy”, Agnew was selected because he was enough from the South to fas-
cinate the Southern moderate electorate, yet he did not represented the Deep 
South symbolically, which might have disheartened Northern centrist voters. 
As the above, even “weird” strategies can stay behind the selection of the presiden-
tial running mate: in 1964, the vice presidential nomination went to little-known 
Republican Party Chairman William E. Miller, a New York Representative. Bar-
ry Goldwater, the Republican presidential candidate, stated that he chose Miller 
simply because “he drives [President] Johnson nuts” (Miller Fitzgerald 2004, 106). 
In 1960, as mentioned at the beginning of this section, John F. Kennedy thought 
that he could not be elected without the back-up of traditional Southern Demo-
crats, most of whom had supported Lyndon Johnson during the primaries. Ken-
nedy asked Johnson to be the vice-presidential candidate the morning after be-
ing nominated for president (Caro 2012, 121-135). Robert F. Kennedy, who 
profoundly disliked Johnson for his previous harsh attacks against the Kennedy 
family, declared later that his brother made that offer to Johnson as an action of 
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“political kindness” and did not expect him to accept the VP nomination. Inves-
tigative journalist Seymour Hersh (1997, 12) agrees with Robert Kennedy’s re-
construction of the events, and wrote that John Kennedy would have preferred 
Missouri Senator Stuart Symington as his running-mate, but Johnson joined 
forces with House Speaker Sam Rayburn to influence Kennedy to favour himself. 
J
ohnson’s biographer Robert Caro (2012, 132) offers different insights. He wrote 
that the Kennedy campaign was desperate to win what was predicted to be a 
very uncertain race. With Californian Richard Nixon and Massachusetts Sena-
tor Henry Cabot Lodge in the Republican ticket, Kennedy believed that John-
son was the right person to help carry Texas and the other Southern states. 
Despite his supposed brother’s interference, John Kennedy met with political ad-
visors such as Larry O’Brien, his national campaign manager, to share the deci-
sion that Johnson was to be Vice President. O’Brien confessed later that John 
Kennedy’s words surprised him, but that after a brief thinking of the electoral 
vote situation, he realized that “it was a stroke of genius”. When John and Rob-
ert Kennedy right after met with their father, Joe Kennedy, he told them that the 
Johnson’s nomination was the best thing they had ever done (Caro 2012, 142). 
General Eisenhower was the Republican presidential candidate in 1952. He 
had no specific pre-agreements for a vice presidential candidate, and Republi-
can national leaders suggested the name of Nixon. Eisenhower quickly agreed 
to the selection (Gellman 1999, 440-441). Nixon’s young age (he was then only 
39), his fierce attitude against communism, and his political stronghold in Cali-
fornia - one of the largest battleground states at the time - were all considered 
as powerful credentials by the Republican establishment (Ambrose 1987, 342). 
In 1952, after the nomination of Stevenson, the Democratic convention had to 
choose a vice president. The main candidates for this position were two South-
ern Senators: John Sparkman from Alabama and A. S. Mike Monroney from 
Oklahoma. President Truman and a restricted cabinet of political advisors chose 
conservative and segregationist Sparkman for the nomination. The convention 
complied with that and nominated Sparkman as Stevenson’s running mate. Steven-
son then famously stated that he aimed to commit himself to “talk sense to the 
American people.” Again, Sparkman was chosen in order to balance the ticket. 
The 1948 election is often accounted for being the greatest reversal in American 
presidential history. Almost every forecast pointed out that Harry Truman would 
be defeated by Thomas Dewey. Both parties suffered acute ideological ruptures, es-
pecially the Democratic Party that splitted apart, with the conservative wing and 
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the far left running third-party campaigns. Truman nominated Kentucky Sena-
tor Alben W. Barkley, who had delivered the convention’s keynote speech, as his 
running mate, with the selection proclaimed by acclamation (DiSalvo 2010). Civil 
rights bills, opposed by several Southern Democrats (such as Barkley), were cru-
cial to Truman’s Fair Deal (Libbey 1979, 93). But, because Barkley was popular 
among conservative Democrats, Truman asked him to be the vice presidential 
nominee (Libbey 1979, 94). And despite the perception that a ticket composed 
by a Missourian incumbent and a Kentuckian conservative lacked geograph-
ic balance, Truman and Barkley were able to win the election (Hatfield 1997, 4). 
Four years earlier, although the party’s conservatives could not prevent Franklin 
D. Roosevelt from running for a fourth term, the decline in the President’s health 
brought many party national leaders to strongly oppose Henry Wallace, who was 
then Roosevelt’s Vice President. He was considered by many Southern Democrats 
as being too liberal and somewhat personally outlandish. Even some progressives 
were suspicious about Wallace’s New Age spiritual beliefs and for his relation with 
the controversial Nicholas Roerich, his personal Russian advisor. So, several par-
ty delegates decided to put in moderate Missouri Senator Harry Truman as FDR’s 
fourth term VP nominee. Roosevelt, who was Wallace’s friend and did not person-
ally know Truman, unwillingly accepted Truman as his running mate in a bid not to 
break party cohesion. A few months later, the dispute around the vice presidential 
nomination suddenly became historic as Roosevelt died in April 1945 and therefore 
Truman assumed the Presidency instead of Wallace. It is also interesting to note that 
on the other side, in a similar effort to keep party unity, moderate presidential candi-
date Thomas Dewey chose conservative John William Bricker as his running mate. 
Dewey was the Republican presidential nominee again in 1948 but Bricker was 
not the vice presidential candidate. Dewey decided to select California Gover-
nor Earl Warren, thinking that the 1948 ticket would win California which the 
Dewey-Bricker campaign had failed to do four years earlier. However, the Dew-
ey-Warren ticket did not secure California and the absence of Bricker on the ticket 
may have been a factor in Dewey not winning Bricker’s home state of Ohio again. 
Wendell Willkie’s nomination for the Republicans in 1940 is still considered by his-
torians to have been one of the most dramatic moments in any political convention. 
Willkie did not care much about the name of his running mate and decided to leave the 
decision to convention chairman Joe Martin, who proposed Senate Minority Leader 
Charles L. McNary of Oregon. Wilkie reluctantly accepted the suggestion. Also be-
cause the two men did not agree on many things: “Whether as Vice President of the 
U.S. Charley McNary can keep on endorsing Government-power projects, isolation, 
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high tariffs and huge outlays for farm relief under a President who believes in none 
of these things remains to be seen” (Neuberger 1940). Therefore, McNary seemed to 
be a Western farmer who has been selected in order to balance the figure of the pres-
idential candidate Wendell Willkie, a pro-business Eastern politician (Neal 1985, 9). 
McNary’s ideas appeared quite eccentric to Wilkie: the Oregon Senator supported the 
Progressive Era reforms and the direct election of the federal senators and he was an 
early campaigner for public rather than private power companies (Catledge 1940). 
In 1932, once again, the “balancing strategy” was implemented by the Dem-
ocratic presidential candidate, Governor of New York Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
He chose as his running mate John Nance Garner, who was a U.S. represent-
ative from Texas. Garner was a conservative Southern lawyer who contrast-
ed the labour unions strikes of the ‘20s and later, when in office, he also harsh-
ly criticized the high public spending caused by the New Deal’s policies. 
Four years earlier, Republican Herbert Hoover, as many as other presidential 
candidates did, was not keen to interfere in the selection of his running mate. 
The decision was demanded to the party delegates who seemed to agree on con-
firming incumbent Vice President Dawes in the ticket. But as soon as the par-
ty’s orientation started to spread, stepping down president Calvin Coolidge 
sent an angry telegram stating that he would consider a second nomination for 
Dawes, whom he hated, a “personal affront” (Mencken and Nathan 1929, 404). 
After that telegram, and with Coolidge still highly influential, it became virtu-
ally  impossible for Dawes to pursue the VP nomination. Then the party decid-
ed to go for the usual strategy: in order to gain consensus among farmers con-
cerned of Hoover’s pro-business orientation, the nomination was destined to 
longtime Kansas Senator Charles Curtis (Mieczkowski and Carnes 2001, 94). 
In the same year, the Democratic candidate was the Roman Catholic Gov-
ernor of New York Al Smith. Worried that Smith spiritual beliefs would be-
come an issue during the campaign (many Protestants were afraid that Smith 
would be influenced by the Pope instead of choosing the best for the country 
by his own), the Democratic establishment asked the delegates to select Sena-
tor Joseph Taylor Robinson of Arkansas as VP nominee. Robinson was Prot-
estant and Southerner. He was also a dynamic politician and a gifted speak-
er. In some ways he was Smith’s political nemesis (Binning et al. 1999, 135).
The 1924 Democratic primary season suffered a massive cultural and geograph-
ic shift in the party, as one wing (led by William Gibbs McAdoo) had its politi-
cal base composed by rural, Protestant delegates from the South and the Midwest 
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who were in favour of Prohibition. On the other hand, New York Governor Al 
Smith’s was favoured by Catholics, ethnic minorities, anti-Prohibition supporters 
and delegates from the big-cities in the Northeast and urban Midwest. Because of 
the two-thirds rule, neither McAdoo nor Smith were able to win the nomination. 
Ballots followed other ballots and with this unprecedented situation, on the 100th 
count both Smith and McAdoo decided to abandon the race. Then the party con-
vention was able to start looking for a compromise figure who would be accept-
able to both McAdoo and Smith supporters (Prude 1972). Finally, on the 103rd 
ballot, the delegates chose John W. Davis as the presidential candidate. He was a 
former House Representative from West Virginia, virtually unknown to the press 
and to the greater audience. Nebraska Governor Charles Bryan, William Jennings 
Bryan’s brother, was selected as VP nominee. The strategy behind this choice was 
to appeal to rural voters, whom still supported his brother, who was the lead-
er of the populist wing and three times presidential candidate (Tucker 2010, 19).
The Second Strategy: Carrying the Home State 
As the effects of the first strategy are mainly anecdotal and difficult to be meas-
ured, one thing we might be able to address, however, is whether a vice pres-
idential nominee can help the candidate to carry his or her home state. 
Although in 2012, Wisconsin, Paul Ryan’s home state, was carried by Barack Oba-
ma; since 1920, major-party nominees for president have carried their VP’s home 
state 64 percent of the time and the percentage is slightly higher than that, 71 per-
cent in elections since World War II. This, however, is not statistically significant 
by itself. Instead, what we might try to investigate is to measure how many votes a 
vice presidential nominee bring to the ticket relative to how he would do otherwise. 
The way to do this is to compare the presidential ticket’s performance in the vice 
presidential nominee’s state to his numbers nationwide. This analysis is taken (al-
most as it is) from Nate Silver’s blog FiveThirtyEight (2012). As an example as 
the way it works, let’s take a look at the 1948 elections: the Republican vice pres-
idential nominee, California Governor Earl Warren, did not help Thomas Dew-
ey to carry that state, which he lost to Harry Truman. The Dewey-Warren tick-
et came behind by 0.5 percentage points only in California, however, slightly 
better than the 4.5 percentage points it lost by nationwide. Silver call this differ-
ence the relative voting index, or RVI (Cook Political Report 2012). In the case 
above-mentioned, Warren had an RVI. of plus-4 for 1948, because his ticket did 
four points better in his home state than it did nationally. But, according to Sil-
ver, that still does not tell the whole story. Did Republicans’ outperforming their 
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national numbers by four percentage points in California have something to 
do with Governor Warren, or was it a red-leaning state at that time in general? 
As compared to the previous election cycle of 1944, Warren’s performance could 
be considered as very good, since Franklin D. Roosevelt did better in California 
that year than he performed nationally against Dewey’s first presidential attempt. 
In fact, that year California had an RVI of negative-6. So, Warren might have pro-
voked a net swing of 10.5 points, from an RVI of negative-6 in 1944 to plus-4 in 
1948. On the other hand, in 1952, in California, Republicans had an RVI of plus-
14.5, despite Warren’s no longer being on the ticket. But in that year and in the two 
subsequent elections, another candidate from California – Richard Nixon - was in 
one of the two tickets. So, the Warren effect can be calculated adding 1964 to the 
figure. In that year Lyndon Johnson won California by a margin of 18.3 points. 
Using 1948 as the baseline, in other words, averaging together the 1944 and 1964 
comparisons, Warren’s effect on the ticket in California is still positive (a net gain 
of almost five points of RVI) but not as astonishing as it originally seemed to be. 
In Table 1 below, we have adjusted Silver’s comparisons for all major-par-
ty vice presidential nominees since 1920. The comparison is between the tick-
et’s RVI in the year the vice presidential candidate was on the ticket, the next 
and previous election cycles in which he was not on the ticket and when there 
was also no one else from his state running for President or Vice President. 
For instance, in looking at the RVI for Sarah Palin, the Republican nominee for Vice 
President in 2008, the comparison years are 2004 (when Palin was not on the ticket, 
and nobody else from Alaska was) and 2012 (when Sarah Palin was not running and 
nobody else from Alaska was). In the last three elections, Republicans always carried 
Alaska. However, Palin did significantly better than Republican national numbers in 
2008 (+28.8 points). Republicans low performed in 2004 (+23.1 R.V.I) and in 2012 
(+10.1 R.V.I) and so the net gain in 2008 for Palin in her home state is +12.2 points. 
There are also a few cases in which there were multiple candidates on the ticket from 
the same state in the same year. For instance, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., Richard Nix-
on’s vice presidential nominee in 1960, was from Massachusetts, the same state as 
the Democratic presidential nominee John F. Kennedy. Silver’s model simply do not 
consider these years, since Lodge’s performance might have been more a reflection 
of Kennedy’s performance in Massachusetts than his own strengths and weaknesses. 
Overall, the consensus advantage provided by a vice presidential nominee has been 
quite poor under this model. Since 1920, on average, it has given rise to a net gain 
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of about only 2.5 percentage points for the top of the ticket in his/her home state.
Tab. 1: Vice presidential nominees since 1920. Net popular vote (gain). 
Previous Comparison Next Comparison
Party Candidate State EV Year RVI Year RVI Year RVI Net 
Gain
D Biden DE 3 2012 +14,7 2004 +10,1 +4,6
R Ryan WI 3 2012 -3 2008 -6,7 +3,7
D Biden DE 3 2008 +17,7 2004 +10,1 +7,7
R Palin AK 3 2008 +28,8 2004 +23,1 2012 +10,1 +12,2
D Edwards NC 15 2004 -10 2000 -13,4 2008 -6,9 +0,2
R Cheney WY 3 2004 +37,3 2000 +21,5 2008 +39,5 +6,8
D Lieber-
man
CT 8 2000 +17 1996 +9,6 2004 +12,5 +5,9
R Cheney WY 3 2000 +40,6 1996 +21,5 2008 +39,5 +10,1
D Gore TN 11 1996 -6,1 1988 -8,6 2004 -11,8 +4,1
R Kemp NY 33 1996 -20,3 1992 -10,3 2000 -24,5 -2,9
D Gore TN 11 1992 -0,9 1988 -8,6 2004 -11,8 +9,3
R Quayle IN 12 1992 +11,8 1984 +5,5 1996 +14,1 +2
R Quayle IN 12 1988 +12,4 1984 +5,5 1996 +14,1 +2,6
D Ferraro NY 36 1984 +10,2 1980 +7,1 1988 +11,8 +0,8
R Bush TX 29 1984 +9 1976 +1,1 1996 +13,5 +1,7
D Mondale MN 10 1980 +13,7 1972 +17,6 1988 +14,8 -2,5
R Bush TX 26 1980 +4,1 1976 +1,1 1996 +13,5 -3,2
D Mondale MN 10 1976 +10,8 1972 +17,6 1988 +14,8 -5,4
R Dole KS 7 1976 +9,6 1972 +15 1980 +14,8 -5,3
D Muskie ME 4 1968 +11,5 1964 +15,1 1972 +0,5 +3,7
R Agnew MD 10 1968 -2,3 1964 -8,4 1976 -4 +3,9
D Hum-
phrey
MN 10 1964 +5,2 1960 +1,3 1972 +17,6 -4,3
R Miller NY 43 1964 -14,7 1960 -5,1 1968 -6,2 -9
D Johnson TX 24 1960 +1,8 1956 +4,1 1968 +2 -1,2
D Kefauver TN 11 1956 +14,8 1952 +10,6 1960 -7,3 +13,2
R Nixon CA 32 1956 -4,3 1944 -6 1964 +4,3 -3,4
D Sparkman AL 11 1952 +40,4 1944 +56,6 1956 +32,4 -4,1
R Nixon CA 32 1952 +3,7 1944 -6 1964 +4,3 +4,6
D Barkley KY 11 1948 +10,8 1944 +13,7 1952 +10,9 -1,6
R Warren CA 25 1948 +4 1944 -6 1964 +4,3 +4,9
D Truman MO 15 1944 -4,6 1940 -4,8 1952 +9,3 -6,8
R Bricker OH 25 1944 +7,1 1940 +5,5 1948 +4,2 +2,2
D Wallace IA 11 1940 -14,4 1936 -12,5 1944 -12 -2,1
R McNary OR 5 1940 +1,9 1936 -10,5 1944 +2,6 +5,8
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D Garner TX 23 1936 +50,5 1928 +13,8 1940 +62 +12,6
R Knox IL 29 1936 +6,2 1932 +4,6 1940 +6,9 +0,5
D Garner TX 23 1932 +59 1928 +13,8 1940 +62 +21,1
R Curtis KS 9 1932 +8,3 1924 +12,7 1940 +24,4 -10,2
D Robinson AR 9 1928 +38,4 1924 +57,2 1932 +55,3 -17,8
R Curtis KS 10 1928 +27,5 1924 +12,7 1940 +24,4 +9
D Bryan NE 8 1924 +7,7 1920 -7,2 1928 -9,6 +16,1
R Dawes IL 29 1924 +10,3 1920 +16,1 1928 -2,8 +3,6
D Roosevelt NY 45 1920 -11,4 1916 -10,1 1924 -1,4 -5,7
R Coolidge MA 18 1920 +14,5 1916 +7,1 1928 -18,5 +20,3
Average +10,66 +6,52 +10,33 +2,44
Table 1 shows an impressive series of inferences. But there are also several ques-
tionable points connected to this analysis. First of all, and using the words of the 
author of the chart, the model takes for granted that the vice presidential nominee 
is popular in his/her home state. That is certainly sure for recent candidates such as 
Ryan, Biden, Palin, Cheney and so on. But it is difficult to check it out for candidates 
from the distant past. Indeed, it might have happened that some of the nominees 
were not much appreciated by their fellow citizens.  And, of course, there is no 
reason to expect vice presidential candidates to give rise to a home-state effect if 
the approval rating polls point out that the voters in his/her state don’t like them. 
A second observation is that the net advantage determined by the vice presidential 
candidates has been greater in recent years — more than four points on average rather 
than two in elections since 1984. That could just be a statistical coincidence, although 
it could also show the fact that vice presidential nominees are having a greater impact 
than they once did. Lately, only a few VP nominee were not able to win their own 
state. However, on a different point of view, almost all the VP nominee coming from 
battleground states or states that were difficult to win for their party lost their own 
territory: Paul Ryan in Wisconsin in 2012, John Edwards in North Carolina in 2004, 
Jack Kemp in New York in 1996, Lloyd Bentsen in Texas in 1988 (although the Re-
publican presidential candidate George H. W. Bush was coming from Texas as well) 
and Geraldine Ferraro in New York in 1984. The only significant exception is repre-
sented by Al Gore, who, as a Democratic vice presidential candidate in 1992 and in 
1996 was able to win in his own Tennessee, a state that had not voted Republican for 
the previous sixteen years. Paradoxically, four years later, when he was the Democrat-
ic presidential candidate, Al Gore lost Tennessee to George W. Bush (Romero 2001). 
Third, data suggest that some vice presidential nominees produce more impact than 
others. Current governors or senators have given rise to a quite larger gain on average 
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(about 4 points rather than 1.5) than those who were no longer in office, or who were 
U.S. representatives and therefore represented a single House district rather than the 
whole state. And this is also easily intuitive: senators and governors also serve for longer 
terms and they usually benefit from more extensive media coverage (Cohen 2001). 
Fourth, the effects are probably more sounding in smaller states than in bigger ones, 
maybe because their political cultures are more cohesive and it’s rarer for them to see a 
native son nominated to a presidential ticket. Vice presidential nominees from states 
with fewer electoral votes have historically provided a larger home-state boost — Joe 
Biden and Sarah Palin each had significant effects in Delaware and Alaska in 2008. 
Fifth, although electoral coalitions have been quite steady in the recent decades, that 
has not always been like this; Vermont was once one of the most Republican states 
in the country, and Arizona one of the most Democratic. Therefore, it seems that 
there are many controversial messages in the data, as these alterations can some-
times be more powerful than any effect a vice presidential nominee might have. 
A different method of analysis might be able to cover some of these issues, although 
other problems are probably not tractable given the relative scarcity of data (just 
one presidential election every four years) and the inherent challenge in searching 
the causes behind anyone’s vote. With that said, it seems that the vice presidential 
nominee’s effect on his or her home state is normally pretty modest, just around two 
or three percentage points on average. Certainly, two or three percentage points in 
one or more swing states is something that every candidate would hope to achieve, 
but it is probably not enough to overstate the other variables – positive and neg-
ative -  that a vice presidential candidate could potentially bring in to the ticket. 
Indeed, in the last two decades, presidential campaigns have not resorted 
in this principle, with recent vice presidential nominees coming from states 
like Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware and Wyoming that are currently consid-
ered not competitive. In 2012, however, Mitt Romney decided to “risk” again, 
picking Paul Ryan from Wisconsin, a potential battleground state. Although 
Ryan halved the gap between Republicans and Democrats, he was not able 
to turn his home state to Red (it would have been the first time since 1984).
Conclusion 
In the first section of this paper we aimed to list and briefly describe the most 
meaningful vice presidential choices since 1920. Obviously, at a first sight, 
the main reason for selecting the running mate has been to make the tick-
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et more appealing for voters. On a more exhaustive analysis, however, the 
more common rationale appears the one that aims to “balance the ticket”. 
The VP candidate is often chosen to complement the top of the ticket geographically 
(a presidential candidate from the North should run together with a VP from the 
South: Kennedy-Johnson in 1960, for example). Or politically, in order to keep all 
the “wings” of the party together:  a perfect example comes from the 1948 elections 
when Thomas Dewey, a moderate Republican, chose the conservative John William 
Bricker as his running mate. Also other dichotomies are quite common: youth v. 
seniority - or in the other sense: experience v. inexperience - and in this group 
can be placed the tickets Bush sr.-Quayle, McCain-Palin and also Obama-Biden. 
These are the most evident rationales but probably also other explanations stay behind 
each vice presidential selection. And it is also possible that some of them are probably 
just the outcome of an over interpretation of the events. What it appears clear is that 
presidential candidates want to offer to voters the most extensive ticket possible. The 
VP should add to the presidential candidate the qualities, the characteristics and the 
votes that the presidential nominee doesn’t have or that he is not able to carry himself. 
Millions of lines have been written about VP candidates’ selection, campaign 
performances and also about their possible political outcomes on the final elec-
toral result. But it is never been easy to measure the real VP effect. The scien-
tific literature is not extensive and it usually focuses at national level. Collect-
ing opinion polls and correlating different voting data is the usual method to 
estimate the VP nominee effect in the presidential elections. The analysis pro-
posed in the second paragraph is less ambitious but perhaps more accurate. 
Based on the model elaborated by statistician Nate Silver, the idea was to measure the 
VP nominee effect in his/her home state. Basically, the model aimed to estimate the 
so-called native son effect, that is, usually, the second reason for selecting one running 
mate instead of another. Or, at least, it is something expected from the vice presiden-
tial candidate. Additionally, for what concerns “integrating geographically the Pres-
idential candidate’s characteristics”, this strategy can also be considered inter-related 
to “carrying the home state”. Think about the selection of Johnson in 1960 and Ed-
wards in 2004: we know they were chosen because they came from the South, so their 
potential home-state effect could have been spread around their neighbouring states.
Paradoxically, this analysis may be complicated by the inter-relation with the 
factor explained in the first section, that is the potential for ticket-balanc-
ing. For example, John Kerry may have picked John Edwards of North Caro-
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lina in 2004 because he was worried about how he might perform in the South. 
If a presidential candidate is deliberately selecting a vice presidential nom-
inee from a state where he otherwise expects not to gain many votes, an analy-
sis like this might inaccurately allocate a poor performance to the vice pres-
idential candidate when the problem is with the top of the ticket instead. 
The most interesting outcome from section two is that the vice presidential effect 
in his/her home state is poor. At first glance, it could appear huge – because each 
presidential campaign is usually compared only with the previous and the next. But, 
when the interference with other candidates is removed, and though each home 
state effect is correctly compared with the right election, numbers lower signifi-
cantly. The 2.5 per cent average net gain showed in Table 1 looks even almost ir-
relevant if we consider the whole political landscape, namely the Electoral College 
system.  Indeed, the biggest gains are from VP nominees who came from states 
that were not up for grab, but solidly voting for their party. So, what’s the point for 
Republicans – for instance – of winning Alaska by 20 points instead of 10? Or for 
Democrats to secure Delaware by a margin of 18 points instead of 10? In terms 
of winning the presidency, there is no sense. Many of the last VP nominees came 
from “safe” states, where their victory was already sure since the beginning. The 
few latest exceptions were Al Gore in 1992 and 1996, Jack Kemp in 1996, John Ed-
wards in 2004 and Paul Ryan in 2012. Except for Gore, all lost their home state. 
And Kemp and Edwards even had a counter-productive effect, because they got a 
negative balance compared to their party’s previous performance in those states. 
Going back a little, it is worthwhile to mention the Walter Mondale 1976’s suc-
cess in Minnesota, a state that four years earlier voted for Nixon (but that voted 
for Humphrey, Johnson and Kennedy previously). There are also other cases in the 
further past, but they all happened before the last political realignment (the one of 
the late -60’s-early -70’s) and so it is not that easy to make diachronic comparisons. 
It is difficult to draw general rules from this analysis. What it is sure is that many of 
the recent VP candidates came from non-competitive states and that the VP nom-
inees’ effect in their home state is paltry. In general, it seems more common the 
idea that the VP candidate is chosen with the attempt to balance the ticket. It is 
a strategy that concerns the party’s inner balance and its necessity not to alienate 
some portions of the electorate. In these cases, the most employed tactic is to se-
lect moderate VP for radical presidential candidates (or vice versa), Southern VP 
for Northern candidate (or vice versa) or young VP for expert candidates (or vice 
versa). We have also seen how sometimes – especially in the past - the VP process 
of selection is left to the party’s establishment or it is considered a minor issue. 
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On this point, we should bear in mind what statistics suggest: despite the low effective 
powers granted by Article II of the Constitution, Vice Presidents usually have a bright 
future in front of them. Since 1900, about 25 percent of the people nominated for Vice 
President by Republicans and Democrats have later become presidential nominees 
themselves, and 15 percent have actually become president, whether by winning the 
office on their own or by succeeding an incumbent who died or resigned in office.
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